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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the intraday co-movements between returns on several 
commodity markets and on the stock market in the United States over the 1997-
2011 period. By exploiting a new high frequency database, we compute various 
rolling correlations at (i) 1-hour, (ii) 5-minute, (iii) 10-second, and (iv) 1-second 
frequencies. Using this database, we document a synchronized structural break, 
characterized by a departure from zero, which starts in the course of 2008 and 
continues thereafter. This is consistent with the idea that recent financial 
innovations on commodity futures exchanges, in particular the high frequency 
trading activities and algorithm strategies have an impact on these correlations. 
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This paper analyses the short-term co-movements between returns on several 
commodity markets and on the US stock market over the 1997-2011 period. By 
exploiting the new Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database, we compute 
various rolling correlations at higher frequencies than the daily one, which is the 
standard in existing literature. More precisely, we analyse the co-movement of the 
returns of the front month futures contracts of energy and soft commodities with 
the S&P 500 futures at four high frequencies: (i) 1-hour, (ii) 5-minute, (iii) 10-second, 
and (iv) 1-second. Using these new data, we observe and document a synchronized 
structural break, which starts during 2008 and continues until the latest observation 
of our dataset, the end of 2011. 
 
At daily-frequency, the distribution of the correlations between commodities and 
stock indices has been increasing almost steadily since 2003-2004 (UNCTAD, 2011). 
At higher-than-daily frequency, prior to 2008, there is no strong or long-lasting 
deviation from zero between the commodity and the equity markets. Afterwards, a 
structural break occurs in the data. During the second and third quarters of 2008, the 
correlations depart from zero and move temporarily to negative territories, and then 
move in late September, early October 2008 to positive levels, where they have 
remained almost constant since then. 
 
Several studies highlight the growing cross-market correlations within different types 
of commodities, but also between commodities and other classes of financial assets. 
UNCTAD (2011), for instance, finds that over 30 days the 1-day rolling correlation 
between crude oil and other financial assets, like currencies and the S&P 500, has 
grown steadily since 2004. Tang and Xiong (2011) find similar results by looking at 1-
day rolling correlations between crude oil and selected soft and hard commodities 
over 1-year. These two studies mostly attribute the structural change to the 
financialization of commodity markets. Tang and Xiong (2011) also argue that 
portfolio rebalancing by index investors can act as a channel to spillover shocks from 
outside to commodities markets and across different commodities. By contrast, Stoll 
and Whaley (2010) and (2011) conclude that commodity index flows, whether due to 
rolling over existing futures positions or establishing new ones, have little impact on 
futures prices. 
 
By using daily data, Büyükşahin, Haigh and Robe (2010) document that the 
correlation between equity and commodity returns increases sharply in the fall of 
2008. Nevertheless, the authors argue that there is little evidence of a secular 
increase in spillovers from equity to commodity markets during extreme events. 
Using non-public data from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 
Büyükşahin and Robe (2011) show that the daily correlation between the returns on 
commodity and equity indices soared after the demise of Lehman Brothers, and 
remained exceptionally high through the winter of 2010. Their econometric analyses 
suggest that, besides macroeconomic fundamentals, hedge fund positions help 
explain changes in the strength of equity-commodity linkages. Yet, as the authors 
acknowledge, “hedge funds activities are very diverse”, but their data do not allow 
them to distinguish between the types of hedge fund activities behind these positive 
correlations. This leaves many unanswered questions regarding the determinants of 
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these growing co-movements, in particular the role of economic fundamentals or of 
other type of investing strategies. 
 
To our knowledge, we are the first to look at the evolution of commodity markets—
including oil, corn, soybeans, wheat, sugar and live cattle—at such high frequencies 
and to shed some light on the impact of intra-day investment strategies in the 
context of the new structural change of 2008. This is of importance since the 
emergence of full electronic trading in many commodity markets in the mid-2000s 
has paved the way for new types of market participants, including some with very 
short term investment strategies. Thus, our study adds to Büyükşahin and Robe 
(2011) by highlighting the growing role in commodities trading of intra-day 
investment strategies, which typically use algorithm strategies and robots for their 
operations.2 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section I presents the broader context in 
which this research is incorporated and reviews other related literature. Section II 
describes our data and methodology. Section III shows the evolution of the co-
movements between selected commodities and equities markets. Section IV 
discusses the results and hypothesizes what could explain this structural change. 
Section V concludes. 
 
 
I. Broader context and other related literature 
 
The causes behind the recent sharp price movements of many primary commodities 
have fuelled an intense debate among academics, asset managers, investment 
banks, and policy makers. The debate reflects several developments over the last 
decade. First, large developing economies have experienced a rapid and steady 
growth, boosting the global demand for primary commodities. Second, large supply 
shocks like adverse weather and export bans have amplified price movements on 
some already tight markets. Third, the growing presence of financial investors in the 
commodity markets has become significant. While these developments are widely 
acknowledged, the arguments arise when one tries to assess the impacts of these 
factors on the prices of commodities. In particular, there is debate whether the 
financialization of commodity trading—which refers to the increasing role of 
financial motives, financial markets and financial actors in the operation of 
commodity markets—de-stabilizes these markets. 
 
Investing in commodities through futures markets has gained importance among 
financial investors after the burst of the dot-com bubble, as these agents looked for 
a new asset class to diversify their portfolio and reduce their risks. The publication of 
the seminal paper by Gorton and Rouwenhort (2006) entitled "Facts and Fantasies 
about Commodities" supported this diversification strategy. Using monthly returns 
spanning the period from July 1959 to March 2004, the authors found that 
commodity futures have historically offered the same return and Sharpe ratio as 
                                                 
2
 Büyükşahin and Robe (2011) data do not track the activities of market participants who do not hold 
position at the end of the day, because these actors do not have the obligation to report to the CFTC. 
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equities but are negatively correlated with equity and bond returns owing to 
different behaviour over the business cycle.3 In parallel, investment in commodities 
became a common part of a large investor portfolio allocation, while commodity 
indexes saw their assets under management soar. From less than $10 billion around 
the end of the last century, commodity assets under management reached a record 
high of $450 billion in April 2011 (Institute of International Finance, 2011). In the 
meantime, commodity investment specialists, asset managers and investment banks 
have created new products linked to commodities to satisfy the demand from 
investors.  
 
Consequently, the volumes of exchange-traded derivatives on commodity markets 
are now twenty to thirty times greater than physical production (Silvennoinen and 
Thorp, 2010). By contrast, in the 1990s, financial investors accounted, on average, 
for less than 25 per cent of all market participants. Today, in some extreme 
occurrences, financial investors represent more than 85 per cent of all commodity 
futures market participants (Masters, 2008). 
 
The last decade was also characterized by significant technical developments in the 
trading platforms of commodity exchanges. Pit trading became more marginal and 
full electronic trading, which allows almost uninterrupted trading around the clock, 
has been introduced on the main commodity exchanges since 2005. Due to lower 
transaction costs, electronic trading led to an increase in the number of transactions 
and the volumes involved. Full electronic trading also paved the way for high 
frequency trading (HFT) and algorithm trading activities. 
 
The benefits of these evolutions have been debated. On the one hand, the 
proponents would usually argue that the presence of these new types of agents in 
commodities markets would ease the price discovery problem and bring the price 
closer to its underlying fundamentals. In addition, it would provide further liquidity 
and transfer risks to agents who are better prepared to assume it. On the other 
hand, a growing number of studies provide evidence of price distortions linked to the 
financialization of commodity markets (see UNCTAD, 2011: chapter 4.5, for an 
overview). Most of these studies base their analysis on index trading. However, since 
2008/2009, investors prefer more active investment strategies on commodity 
markets than simple index trading (UNCTAD, 2011). Looking at intra-day data and 
cross-markets correlations is one way to get a better grasp of some recent 
developments that have affected the commodity markets. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The Sharpe ratio is a measure of the excess return per unit of deviation in an investment asset or a 
trading strategy, typically referred to as risk. It is defined as: 
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, where R is the 
asset return, Rf is the return on a benchmark asset, such as the risk free rate of return, E[R − Rf] is 
the expected value of the excess of the asset return over the benchmark return, 
and [ ]fRR −var  is the standard deviation of the excess of the asset return. 
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II. Data and methodology 
 
a. Data 
 
The TRTH database provides financial data for a wide range of financial instruments 
based on the information transmitted by exchanges and market makers. TRTH 
contains historical data back to January 1996 of granular tick as well as lower 
frequency pricing data, up to the microsecond level. In particular, TRTH offers full 
tick, global, intra-day time and sales, time and quotes and market depth data 
covering an extensive range of asset classes with more than 45 million unique 
instruments across more than 400 exchanges. The database provides also over-the-
counter (OTC) quotes and offers the most comprehensive pricing and reference data 
service. It provides a precise record of market behaviour and manages 2 petabytes 
(i.e. 2 ∙ 1015 bytes or 2 million gigabytes) of tick data. 
 
In this study, we limit ourselves to a few instruments. We select one of the most 
liquid equity derivatives, the E-mini S&P 500 futures, and derivative contracts of 
selected commodities, namely: light crude oil WTI (NYMEX), corn (CBOT), wheat 
(CBOT), sugar #11 (ICE - US), soybeans (CBOT) and live cattle (CME).4 These 
commodity futures contracts represent the commonly used benchmarks for the 
world or the United States for their respective markets. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics for each future contract. Each derivative 
contract has an underlying physical asset described in the "Specification" column and 
arrives at maturity on specific dates in the future, which we refer to as "Contract 
month". Several derivatives referring to the same underlying asset are traded in 
parallel during the trading sessions but are differentiated by their maturity dates (i.e. 
E-mini S&P500 March 2012, E-mini S&P June 2012, etc.). The front months for each 
derivative usually have the greatest liquidity. For each selected derivative, TRTH 
computes the continuous contract by taking the front month and rolling over to the 
next contract at expiry. We consider for our study these continuous front month 
futures spanning between 1996 and 2011. 
 
For our study, we compute cross-market rolling correlation between the E-mini 
S&P500 and the selected commodity derivatives. The E-mini futures are traded on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) electronic platform Globex. Since its launch 
in 1997, the E-mini S&P 500 futures have become the most traded index futures 
contracts in the world. The majority of traders prefer the mini futures to the futures 
because of its reduced size.5 Unlike the S&P 500 futures, which still use the open 
                                                 
4
 In parenthesis, the various acronyms stand for the exchanges names where the contract is traded. 
More precisely: CBOT (Chicago Board of Trade), ICE - US (Intercontinental Exchange - United States), 
NYMEX (New York Mercantile Exchange), CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange). 
5
 The value of the S&P 500 futures was originally 500 times the S&P 500 index which was too large for 
many traders. Consequently the CME introduced the E-mini future on the S&P 500 which trades at a 
value of 50 times the underlying equity index. 
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outcry during business hours on weekdays,6 trading on the E-mini is only electronic. 
This represents another advantage for hedge funds, algorithm traders and high 
frequency traders wishing to implement fully automated investment strategies. 
 
Table 1: Description of the selected instruments 
Abbreviations Specification 
Exchange 
and 
Trading 
Platform 
Contract 
Month 
 
Recent 
monthly 
exchanged 
volumes (in 
million of 
contracts) 
Remarks 
E-mini S&P 500 
50 x E-mini S&P 
500 futures 
price 
CME / CME 
Globex 
March, June, 
September, 
December 
45-52 
The most traded 
index futures in 
the world 
WTI 
1,000 barrels of 
light sweet 
crude oil 
NYMEX / 
CME Globex 
Every month 10-14 
The most actively 
traded energy 
product in the 
world 
Corn 
5,000 bushels 
(~ 127 Metric 
Tons) 
CBOT / CME 
Globex 
March, May, 
July, September 
and December 
5-9  
Soybean 
5,000 bushels 
(~136 metric 
tons) 
CBOT / CME 
Globex 
January, March, 
May, July, 
August, 
September and 
November 
4-3  
Wheat 
5,000 bushels 
(~ 136 Metric 
Tons) 
CBOT / CME 
Globex 
March, May, 
July, September 
and December 
1-2  
Sugar #11 
112,000 
pounds 
ICE - US / ICE 
electronic 
platform 
March, May, 
July and 
October 
1-3 
The world 
benchmark for 
raw sugar trading 
Live Cattle 
40,000 pounds 
(~18 metric 
tons) 
CME / CME 
Globex 
February, April, 
June, August, 
October and 
December 
0.8-1.5  
 
As we mentioned, TRTH collects ticks from the various exchange feed. Table 2 
summarizes the number of ticks for each year and each derivative contract. We 
consider only ticks that represent an actual trade. Thus, we do not consider quotes. 
The emergence of full electronic trading in the course of 2006 on the considered 
commodity exchanges marks the beginning of an increase in the amount of ticks 
                                                 
6
 Currently, the S&P 500 futures trades at a value of 250 times the index and continues to have an 
open outcry session during weekdays from 8:30 a.m. to 3:15 p.m. (see 
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/equity-index/us-index/sandp-500_contract_specifications.html) 
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(Figure 1). Indeed, between 2005 and 2007, we observe an increase of ticks from 
about 380 per cent up to 1200 per cent. For the period between 2007 and 2011, the 
increase remains substantial, ranging from about 160 per cent to 1100 per cent. The 
overall expansion from 2005 to 2011 is situated between about 800 per cent and 
6000 per cent and is largely due to the emergence of electronic trading and to some 
extent to the extension of the platforms opening hours. 
  
Table 2: Number of trades recorded in the Thomson Reuters Tick History 
database by instruments and by year, 1996-2011 
Year 
E-mini 
S&P 500 
WTI Corn Soybean Sugar Wheat 
Live 
Cattle 
1996 N/A 356'681 108'708 120'320 183'682 83'191 118'111 
1997 344'463 338'510 104'159 153'111 168'981 66'190 102'963 
1998 1'801'293 393'969 87'849 116'833 207'079 70'855 113'616 
1999 3'826'763 477'315 79'392 118'535 216'969 70'171 101'261 
2000 5'886'735 506'757 70'092 141'714 259'995 75'969 74'306 
2001 8'454'680 485'506 56'622 115'783 198'621 75'368 93'263 
2002 14'861'346 575'768 98'294 147'353 125'984 96'301 93'924 
2003 14'087'856 606'150 107'870 171'547 128'593 112'802 64'885 
2004 11'464'899 765'729 129'598 220'966 146'773 117'236 40'022 
2005 11'440'985 920'636 133'390 208'292 145'053 116'062 43'618 
2006 11'099'193 2'473'336 514'536 437'522 237'274 306'653 88'929 
2007 22'199'625 11'977'928 1'502'759 1'513'150 853'963 1'126'673 209'100 
2008 49'623'225 21'485'557 2'473'190 3'219'628 2'884'089 2'060'812 540'087 
2009 41'782'313 21'157'094 2'412'398 2'871'907 2'167'801 1'765'585 803'894 
2010 107’371’791 31'654'954 8'130'368 5'520'895 4'572'232 3'886'602 2'505'924 
2011 121’069’682 41'943'006 10'716'091 7'021'293 4'513'119 5'101'041 3'785'946 
Total 425'314'849 136'118'896 26'725'316 22'098'849 17'010'208 15'131'511 8'779'849 
 
Figure 1: Number of trades recorded in the Thomson Reuters Tick History 
database by commodity, 1996-2011 
10'000
100'000
1'000'000
10'000'000
100'000'000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
WTI Corn Soybean Sugar Wheat Live Cattle
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
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b. Methodology 
 
We compute the log returns of the mean prices at 1-hour, 5-minute, 10-second and 
1-second intervals. Then we calculate a moving-window correlation coefficient 
(MWC) at time (t) between two series (rx and ry) at frequency (f) with a window 
width set to 15:7 
( )( )
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i
itrz
rz and 
tz reflects the average of the actual trade prices taking place on the exchange of the 
asset z during the time interval ] ]tft ;− , yxz ,, =∀ . 
 
To avoid misleading conclusions owing to a composition effect in our data, we 
exclude weekend observations because there is no trade during these days in the 
years prior to the introduction of electronic trading. 
 
Table 3 describes the distribution of the MWCs for each frequency over the years or 
the times of the day. For our lowest frequency, 1-hour, the distributions are more 
uniform. The higher the frequency, the less uniform the distributions according to 
these two parameters. The computation of one MWC requires a full set of trading 
transactions on both markets over five successive periods for the 1-hour MWC (see 
footnote 7) and fifteen successive periods for the three higher frequencies. As a 
result, there are few or no observations for many years prior to the introduction of 
electronic trading, particularly at the 10- and 1-second frequencies. For the time of 
the day, the distributions of the 10- and 1-second MWCs, are concentrated between 
1 p.m. and 6 p.m. GMT, which coincides with the periods when the market activity is 
the most intense, i.e. during working hours in Europe and the United States. For 
lower frequencies, like the 5-minute one, the differences along these two 
parameters matter less. Indeed, at least one trading transaction is likely to take place 
during each of the 15 successive 5-minute intervals, no matter what time of the day, 
except between the closure of the American and the opening of the Asian markets. 
Basic calculations show that we obtain an almost full set of data during the last years 
of the sample for the two lowest frequencies we consider.8  
 
 
                                                 
7 As we did not allow gaps within the observations of a given window when computing the rolling 
correlation coefficients, the width of the window could not be too long, especially in the early years of 
the sample, when trade was less frequent. Yet, we refrained ourselves from picking a shorter width of 
the window, which could potentially capture more the impact of “one time” instantaneous reaction to 
news, shocks, etc. For 1-hour frequency, we set the width of the window to 5, since prior to electronic 
trading, exchange places were not open for such a long time period on a daily basis. 
8
 The amount of weekdays per year is approximately 250. This means that a full set of data will 
correspond approximately to 6,000 (=250∙24) and 72,000 (=250∙24∙12) for 1-hour and 5-minute data, 
respectively. For 2010, our sample contains 5,538 and 59,584 MWCs for 1-hour and 5-minute series, 
respectively. 
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Table 3:Distribution of the moving-window correlation coefficient between the 
returns on the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front month), by 
years or time of day, and the total number of observations, by frequency 
Frequency 
 
1-hour 5-minute 10-second 1-second 
1997* 0.67 0.71 0.00 - 
1998 3.24 2.62 0.06 - 
1999 3.93 2.89 0.16 - 
2000 4.10 2.91 0.20 - 
2001 4.63 2.59 0.22 - 
2002 4.71 2.45 0.35 - 
2003 7.37 2.80 0.34 - 
2004 8.28 3.60 0.62 - 
2005 8.60 4.71 0.43 - 
2006 8.89 6.35 2.04 0.07 
2007 9.05 10.97 13.16 4.31 
2008 9.13 13.39 19.53 21.70 
2009 9.15 14.32 19.39 22.32 
2010 9.12 14.82 20.38 24.27 
Y
e
a
r
 
2011 9.13 14.89 23.11 27.34 
0 4.03 1.83 0.03 - 
1 3.92 2.81 0.04 0.00 
2 3.86 3.01 0.04 0.00 
3 3.71 2.73 0.02 - 
4 3.59 2.53 0.02 - 
5 3.44 2.79 0.02 - 
6 4.18 2.93 0.11 0.00 
7 4.13 3.33 0.76 0.01 
8 4.14 4.04 1.15 0.01 
9 4.16 4.55 0.75 0.00 
10 4.24 4.81 0.74 0.01 
11 4.38 4.91 1.31 0.06 
12 4.48 5.19 4.87 2.14 
13 4.39 5.20 11.02 18.39 
14 4.25 4.38 15.67 31.23 
15 4.28 6.82 16.37 20.52 
16 4.29 9.56 14.23 8.74 
17 4.27 9.90 13.38 5.14 
18 4.24 8.92 12.21 9.40 
19 4.50 6.07 6.03 4.28 
20 4.70 2.37 1.13 0.06 
21 4.43 0.45 0.09 0.01 
22 4.24 0.02 0.00 - 
T
im
e
 
o
f 
da
y
,
 
ho
u
r
 
G
M
T
 
23 4.14 0.85 0.00 - 
# observations 60,753 402,183 2,546,114 788,625 
Notes: *Our sample starts on 23 September 1997. “–” indicates no observation. 
Source: Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
 
 
III. Results 
 
In this section, we use boxplots to describe the distribution of the rolling correlations 
between the E-mini S&P 500 and various commodity futures at various frequencies.9 
Boxplots are a convenient way to represent the evolution of the correlation 
distribution over time by providing five descriptive statistics. The bottom and top of 
the box correspond to the lower (Q1) and upper (Q3) quartiles, respectively; the 
                                                 
9 
Most commodity derivatives are not liquid enough to compute rolling correlation at the 1 second 
frequency, the only exception being crude oil. 
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band near the middle of the box is the median (Q2); the ends of the whiskers 
represent the lowest datum still within 1.5 interquartile range (IQR) of the lower 
quartile, and the highest datum still within 1.5 IQR of the upper quartile. Any other 
datum lying outside the two whiskers is considered to be an outlier and is 
represented by a dot. 
 
We start by looking at crude oil by focusing mainly on 1-hour, 5-minute, 10-second 
and 1-second time intervals. Then, we present similar results for five types of soft 
commodities using correlations at 5-minute intervals. 
 
a. Crude oil 
 
Figures 2 a, b, c and d present the evolution between 1997 and 2011 of the rolling 
correlations between the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures, at 1-hour, 5-minute 
and 10-second, respectively.10 For the sake of comparison, we also provide the 1-day 
rolling correlations chart. 
 
In contrast with daily data—which somehow show a growing positive correlation 
between the S&P 500 and the WTI from 2005 onwards (only temporarily interrupted 
in 2008)—, higher-frequency data do not exhibit any change of structure prior to 
2009. The median correlation in figures 2b to 2d remains close to zero up to 2008. 
Afterwards, the median correlations become strongly positive and remain close to 
0.5. 
 
In order to better grasp the precise timing of this structural change, Figures 3 a, b, c 
and d decompose these distributions over months between January 2007 and 
December 2011. Focusing on this sub-period also allows us to present the 1-second 
rolling correlations. 
 
Overall, there is no real departure from zero until the second quarter of 2008. At the 
1-hour frequency, the median of the correlations, between January 2007 and March 
2008 inclusive, corresponds to 0.11. For higher frequencies, it is even closer to zero. 
It corresponds to 0.06, 0.03 and 0.003, for 5-minute, 10-second and 1-second, 
respectively. 
 
Afterwards, a radical change takes place. The median rolling correlations exhibit a 
temporary U-shaped negative pattern during the second and third quarter of 2008. 
Visually, the departure from zero seems to differ according to the frequency: the 
higher the frequency, the later and the smaller the negative pattern. Then, the 
correlation between both series switches to positive territory. It increases 
significantly in late September, and early October 2008. At the 10-second frequency, 
for instance, the medians of monthly correlations are closely centred on zero up to 
May 2008. Then, they become negative from June until early September 2008; 
afterwards they increase sharply, with a median of the correlations corresponding to 
0.32 in October 2008. By using weekly boxplots, we find that the sharp rise of the 
                                                 
10
 There is not enough liquidity in the years prior to 2006 to compute any rolling-correlation at 1-
second intervals. 
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correlations occurred during the second half of September and early October 2008, 
which coincides with an extremely tense period on financial markets following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers.11 This strong positive correlation persists over time 
with a brief exception between February and April 2011. At 10-second frequency, 
the median of the correlations has remained at 0.28 from November 2008 to January 
2011. Afterwards, the median of the correlations decreased to 0.08 during the 
2011m2-2011m4 period, which coincides with the beginning of the uprising in Libya. 
Later on, it moved back to previous levels and even increased in magnitude up to 
around 0.62 in September 2011 (the decline of the IQR reflects a smaller dispersion 
of the rolling correlations). 
                                                 
11
 Results are available upon request. 
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Figure 2a: Annual distribution of the 1-day rolling correlations computed over 15 days 
between the returns on the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front month), 1997-
2011 
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Figure 2b: Annual distribution of the 1-hour rolling correlations computed over 5 hours 
between returns on the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front month), 1997-2011 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
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Figure 2c: Annual distribution of the 5-minute rolling correlations computed over 75 
minutes between the returns on the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front month), 
1997-2011 
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Figure 2d: Annual distribution of the 10-second rolling correlations computed over 150 
seconds between the returns on the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front month), 
1997-2011 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
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Figure 3a: Monthly distribution of the 1-hour rolling correlations computed over 5 
hours between the returns on the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front month), 
2007m1-2011m12 
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Figure 3b: Monthly distribution of the 5-minute rolling correlations computed over 75 
minutes between the returns on the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front month), 
2007m1-2011m12 
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
2007m1 2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
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Figure 3c: Monthly distribution of the 10-second rolling correlations computed over 150 
seconds between the returns on the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front month), 
2007m1-2011m12 
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Figure 3d: Monthly distribution of the 1-second rolling correlations computed over 15 
seconds between the returns on the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front month), 
2007m1-2011m12 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
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b. Soft commodities 
 
We find similar results when we look at the correlation between the E-mini S&P 500 
futures and other soft commodities futures. More precisely, we selected the five 
commodities included in the S&P GSCI index that have the biggest weight among the 
five non-energy and non-metals sub-indices. Four are part of the agriculture sub-
index, namely wheat, corn, soybeans and sugar, while the fifth is part of the livestock 
sub-index and corresponds to live cattle. Altogether, these five components account 
for about three fourths of the total weight of the non-energy and non-metals sub-
indices.12 
 
We consider soft commodities because their economic fundamentals are supposed 
to differ even more from the US equities market than the ones for crude oil. Yet, all 
these commodities present a change in correlation levels occurring in September 
and October 2008. Figures 4a to 4e illustrate our point using 5-minute rolling 
correlation by month for corn, soybeans, wheat, sugar and live cattle, by focusing 
again on the 2007-2011 period. Prior to 2007, the trends are similar to the one 
observed for the WTI. The choice of the 5-minute interval was motivated by a trade-
off between frequency and data availability. Yet, we also obtain similar patterns at 
the 10-second frequency, for the corn, the soybeans and the wheat futures. At 1-
second, no clear change emerges, since there are too few observations at that 
frequency.13  
 
In contrast with the WTI, there is no clear decline of the correlations during the 
2011m2-2011m4 period. This reinforces our hypothesis that the temporary decline 
we observed during these months was related to the uprising in oil-producing Libya. 
Another distinction with the WTI refers to the smaller magnitude of the median 
correlations that emerge at the end of the third quarter of 2008 on these soft 
commodities, even though the co-movements remain positive. Nevertheless, in the 
second half of 2011, the correlations strengthen like in the WTI case. 
 
                                                 
12
 Among the non-energy and non-metals components of the S&P GSCI index, corn, (Chicago) wheat, 
live cattle soybeans and sugar accounted for 17.6%, 16.8%, 14.2%, 12.5% and 12.2%, respectively. 
13
 In the case of corn, the most liquid soft commodity we analyse, there are, for instance, only two 
episodes of 15 seconds in December 2009 with at least one trade taking place at every second. 
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Figure 4a: Monthly distribution of the 5-minute rolling correlations computed over 75 
minutes between the returns on the CBOT Corn and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front 
month), 2007m1-2011m12 
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Figure 4b: Monthly distribution of the 5-minute rolling correlations computed over 75 
minutes between the returns on the CBOT soybeans and the E-mini S&P 500 futures 
(front month), 2007m1-2011m12 
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
2007m1 2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
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Figure 4c: Monthly distribution of the 5-minute rolling correlations computed over 75 
minutes between the returns on the CBOT wheat and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front 
month), 2007m1-2011m12 
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Figure 4d: Monthly distribution of the 5-minute rolling correlations computed over 75 
minutes between the returns on the ICE Sugar and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front 
month), 2007m1-2011m12 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
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Figure 4e: Monthly distribution of the 5-minute rolling correlations computed over 75 
minutes between the returns on the CME live cattle and the E-mini S&P 500 futures 
(front month), 2007m1-2011m12 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
The new structural change just described is remarkable from many aspects: (i) the 
wide range of commodities involved; (ii) the synchronization of this phenomenon; 
and (iii) the similarity of the evolution across commodities. 
 
Moreover, these phenomena were not restricted to the relationship between the 
stock index and the commodity markets. Figure 5 illustrates the co-movements 
between the EUR/USD futures (CME) and the E-mini S&P 500 futures, at 5-minute 
intervals, which exhibits a similar pattern to the one observed between the WTI and 
the E-mini S&P 500 futures, except for the period 2007m8-2008m2. Indeed, the 
chart plots an additional discontinuity that does not appear clearly in the 
commodities and S&P 500 correlations. We observe a slightly positive correlation 
between the EUR/USD and the E-mini S&P 500, prior to the negative U-shaped 
pattern, which we observe during the second and third quarters of 2008.14 
 
                                                 
14
 Here, we use observations at 5-minute intervals. Similar results were obtained using 10-second 
intervals, even though the additional phase described here is less clear. At 1-second, the traditional 
overall pattern also appears, although in a less pronounced manner, probably due to the fewer 
observations in the first years succeeding the introduction of electronic trading. 
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Figure 5: Monthly distribution of the 5-minute rolling correlations computed over 75 
minutes between the returns on the EUR/USD and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front 
month), 2007m1-2011m12 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
 
For the correlations between commodities and the E-mini S&P500, the inflection 
points of the two negative and positive phases (2008m3 and 2008m9) coincides with 
two major events that impacted stock markets worldwide: the Bear Stearns' bailout 
and the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. If we consider the additional phase that appears 
in Figure 5, from 2007m8 to 2008m2, we realize that its starting month corresponds 
to another significant financial shock: the burst of the subprime bubble in the 
summer of 2007. 
 
By looking at Figure 6, we notice the increasing correlation between the WTI and 
EUR/USD pair starts slowly around the summer of 2007. Unlike the correlation 
between the WTI and the E-mini S&P500, the structural change in the correlation 
between the WTI and EUR/USD pair is more gradual and does not exhibit a shift from 
negative to positive territories in the course of 2008. Also, the timing of the recent 
temporary decline differs as it takes place before the Libyan uprising. Hence, it is 
probably due to a new phase of the euro zone crisis starting in November 2010. As 
time passed on, the market realized that the euro crisis would widely affect the 
world economy. This can plausibly explain the return to a positive correlation 
between the EUR/USD pair and the WTI. 
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Figure 6: Monthly distribution of the 5-minute rolling correlations computed over 75 
minutes between the returns on the EUR/USD and the WTI futures (front month), 
2007m1-2011m12 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
 
These elements suggest that one needs to look beyond the strict relationship 
between the stock and commodity markets to find the root cause of these structural 
shifts. In theory, shocks on commodities markets could affect the EUR/USD pair since 
the observed commodities are quoted in dollar. In practice, it is unlikely that 
commodity traders have a significant and permanent influence on this currency pair 
given the large share of non-commodity participants present on the forex market. In 
fact, in 2010, the daily turnover on currency markets was estimated to be $3.98 
trillion (BIS, 2010), well above the daily average of $67 million on the WTI. Although 
a causal link from commodities to the EUR/USD pair is unlikely, changes in the 
EUR/USD exchange rate (or another omitted variable) could affect both, the WTI and 
the E-mini S&P 500 futures, and thus create the correlation between the two series. 
Yet, the question remains why this phenomenon did not exist prior to mid-2007 
between the EUR/USD and the S&P 500 and before 2008 between the most traded 
currency pair and the most traded commodity. Commodities and S&P 500 futures 
traders would hardly start, almost suddenly, to take into account this information in 
there daily routine. Likewise, it is unlikely that traders across commodity and other 
financial markets changed their routine in such a synchronized manner. 
 
The explanation of the structural change documented in this paper is challenging in 
many aspects and raises many questions. These include: 
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a) Why do the median correlations depart from zero and become negative at 
the end of the first quarter of 2008, and why does this trend then switch into 
positive territories in late September 2008? 
b) Why do the median correlations remain so high from September 2008 
onwards? 
c) And more generally, what is the main driving force behind this structural 
change? 
 
While providing final answers to these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, 
we present some facts and discuss some hypotheses that could guide future 
research. 
 
The decoupling of emerging market economies has often been proposed by market 
participants or researchers as a possible answer to the above mentioned questions.15 
This hypothesis refers to the idea that business cycles in emerging market economies 
have recently become more independent of business cycles in advanced economies. 
In 2007 to early 2008, the decoupling hypothesis became popular among investment 
practitioners (Kaiser and Plumberg, 2007). At the same time, China, India and other 
large emerging market economies were considered to be among the key players 
behind the price boom in commodities, owing to their growing demand for raw 
materials. Many investors thought, at first, that the sub-prime crisis would be 
confined to the advanced economies only. This belief might explain the negative 
correlation observed during the second and third quarter of 2008 between 
commodities and the S&P 500. As the initial decoupling hypothesis proved to be 
wrong when the crisis also affected the world real economy, the co-movement 
would have reversed and become positive. Yet, this hypothesis does not provide any 
satisfying explanation for the lasting co-movements observed afterwards. 
 
Another possible answer to the above mentioned questions regards the oscillation 
between safe vs. risky assets. As uncertainties regarding the future increase in 2008, 
market participants would have increased their position in safe assets, like United 
States Treasuries, while in parallel reducing their exposure to risky assets. At the eve 
of Lehman’s bankruptcy, the risk perceptions regarding commodities might have 
differed from the ones regarding equities. Afterwards, both would have been 
perceived similarly. Later on, a lasting positive co-movement between commodities 
and equities would result from a kind of pendulum movement between risky and 
safe assets following good or bad news. 
 
Fear of inflation has also been mentioned as an explanation for the growing 
correlation between the commodity and the equity markets. After the central banks 
massive intervention around the world, both markets have been associated with 
inflation hedge characteristics. 
 
                                                 
15
 Between mid-December 2010 and mid-February 2011, UNCTAD staffs conducted 22 interviews with 
various commodity market participants in the grain, cocoa, sugar and oil markets, ranging from 
physical traders to financial investors, but also including a broker, representatives of a price reporting 
firm and two consultants. For more detailed results, see UNCTAD (2011). 
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Liquidity or volatility changes are other factors suspected of causing cross-market 
correlations. An argument commonly invoked to explain cross-market correlation 
relates to the massive central banks interventions that followed the financial crisis, 
namely quantitative easing. Again, the problem with this view lies in the lasting 
positive correlations observed since September 2008 at such high frequencies. In 
addition, deviation from zero started earlier than the massive intervention of the 
central banks (see Figures 5 and 6). While one should expect growing co-movements 
across the board after the three financial shocks mentioned above or in other 
periods of financial stress, it remains unclear why these co-movements continue for 
months or even years after the shock took place. For instance, the economic 
recovery was clearly in the air after the second quarter of 2009 until fears of a 
sovereign debt crisis developed among investors. A striking fact from the data shows 
that this period of green shoots did not affect the strong positive co-movements 
observed between the stock and commodities markets. The subsequent swings of 
mood of market participants until the end of 2011 have also left it almost intact. 
 
Figure 7 plots the monthly relationship between (i) the VIX monthly average and (ii) 
the median of the 5-minute correlations between the WTI and E-mini S&P 500 
futures that appear in Figure 3b. While positive and significant, this coefficient slope 
is rather weak and the R2 equals only 0.05. In our view, changes in volatility are far 
from fully explaining the lasting positive correlations we observed.  
 
Overall, the above four explanations do not convince us. In particular, they fail to 
explain how economic fundamentals or the risk appetite of financial investors 
changed so quickly. Indeed, news frequencies or human investors’ reaction is 
certainly not as high as 1-second. 
 
The very existence of cross market correlations at such high frequencies is consistent 
with the idea that recent financial innovations on commodity futures exchanges, in 
particular the high frequency trading activities and algorithm strategies, have an 
impact on these correlations. This provides new evidences regarding the impact of 
the financialization of commodity markets. Apart from the increasing amount of 
transactions described in Table 2, an indication of the growing presence of HFT 
strategies in these markets is reflected by the ever-larger volumes traded in an even 
larger number of transactions. Figure 8 illustrates this point by representing with a 
black line the ratio between the volumes and the number of ticks. As we observe, 
the monthly volume per tick has declined since 2007, first gradually and then more 
steps by step-by-step. 
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Figure 7: Relationship between the VIX monthly averages and the monthly median of 
the 5-minute rolling correlations between the returns on the WTI and the E-mini S&P 
500 futures (front month), 2007m1-2011m12 
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Figure 8: Monthly WTI front month contract volumes and tick, as well as the ratio 
between the two, 2007m1-2011m12 
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Indeed, HFT funds gained impetus following the bear market of 2007-2008 because 
they were able to continue to generate profits while the financial sector wreaked 
havoc. Moreover, algorithm funds, or “algo funds”, have developed tremendously 
since then. For the United States equities markets, the HFT funds generated 73 per 
cent of the volume exchanged of all United States equities in 2009 (Iati, 2009). In 
early 2011, Reuters quoted the chief executive officer of the CME Group, saying that 
45 per cent of volume exchanged on the NYMEX was computer driven (Reuters, 
2011), which probably represents a conservative estimate. Anecdotal evidence of 
HFT affecting financial markets started to emerge fairly recently. The Wall Street 
Journal online blog "Market Beat" reported on two well-known HFT funds using 
"strategies based on obscure mathematical correlations" (Rogow, 2009). It explains 
that "with the rise of these automated funds, the stock market is more prone than 
ever to large intraday moves with little or no fundamental catalyst". The Flash Crash 
of 6 May 2010 provides a well-known example. That afternoon, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average plunged about nine per cent within 5 minutes only to recover 
partly those losses within the next 20 minutes. The CFTC and Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) joint report (2010) describes how HFT accelerated the effect of a 
mutual fund's initial selling and contributed to the sharp price declines that day. HFT 
is also believed to trigger unusual commodity market events. Reuters reported of 
recent accidents in 2011 linked to HFT funds on commodities derivatives (Sheppard 
and Spicer, 2011). For instance, on 5 May 2011, despite the absence of major news 
or macroeconomic announcement and in a matter of minutes, a $13 intraday plunge 
on the oil market surprised traders. The Reuters report relates also experiences 
where HFT firms have shift prices either by practice or by design.  
 
Yet, HFT activities are far from being monolithic.16 They are complex in nature, often 
secretive and encompass a broad range of strategies. Drawing up an exhaustive list 
of these strategies is behind the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, they are often 
divided into two broad categories: the market-making operations and the statistical 
arbitrage strategies (Haldane, 2011). 
 
Market-making strategies refer to one particular market and do not create 
correlation by definition. On the contrary, statistical arbitrage strategies seek to 
benefit from assets fluctuations and volatility to gain quick profits (Smith, 2010). As 
already mentioned, in times of financial distress, co-movements between stocks and 
markets tend to increase significantly and these strategies become most profitable 
during those times. During the crisis, the relative importance of statistical arbitrage 
strategies among market participants likely grew. UNCTAD (2011) emphasized that 
investors had moved away from passive strategies and opted for active and 
sometimes even aggressive strategies. As a result, the relative importance of passive 
index trading declined significantly since 2007. In fact, although commodity 
investments reached new historic highs in 2011, the part of index trading declined 
from 65-85 per cent between 2005 and 2007 to about 35 per cent in October 2011 
(Barclays Capital, 2011). Among the investment vehicles following an active strategy, 
a non-negligible number of investors favoured those using trend-following strategies 
                                                 
16
 See also Rose (2010) for an interesting discussion about the techniques used by HFT in relation to 
“dark pools” and “flash orders”. 
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at high speed (Haldane, 2011). This change of market participants can affect the 
price discovery mechanism. In the context of the forex market in the early 1980’s, 
Frankel and Froot (1990) explain how the market shifted weight away from its 
fundamentals due to a composition change in market participants towards the 
technical analysts and trend-following strategies. While we expect these shifts to be 
gradual, some threshold effects could have been reached during the financial crisis, 
which later created some hysteresis effects. 
 
Smith (2010) highlights that statistical arbitrage strategies normally have feedback 
characteristics that could be self-reinforcing. Trend following strategies, for instance, 
typically try to benefit from upward and downward trends by herding. Contrary to 
common wisdom, where first mover may enjoy a monopoly rent, trend-following 
strategies potential returns actually increase with the increasing number of imitators 
and increasing momentum, because the greater the number of trend-followers, the 
stronger the trend. The competition among trend-followers lies in identifying first 
changes in trends: first to invest at the trend inception, first to reverse position when 
the trend fades. Slower competitors may still reap benefits by bandwagoning, as long 
as they exit trades on time, because the alternative of swimming against the tide can 
be very costly. Although individually rational, the overall effect of trend following 
strategies may destabilize markets (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 
1990). Interestingly, Alt, Kaniel and Yoeli (2012) find evidence that trend chasing is 
more likely when information quality is low. Arguably, great uncertainties have 
plagued the financial markets during the last three years. 
 
The period following the financial crisis has been characterized by high uncertainties 
regarding the economic outlook and pessimism owing to the severe reduction of 
saving and wealth worldwide. These put heavy pressure on asset managers to deliver 
performance to their customers. Yet, performance is often a relative concept in 
finance: fund performances are compared with respect to a benchmark index or with 
other rival funds. Given the risk aversion for new losses, many asset managers may 
have well decided to remain close to the benchmark rather than trying to beat the 
market which could also result in underperforming it. By sticking to their benchmark 
or by herding, they would preserve their reputation: they cannot beat the market 
but, at least, they do not underperform. This thinking may create another reason 
why there would have been a shift towards trend following strategies.17 
 
Our last comment refers to the hours of the day when the strongest co-movements 
are observed and how these have changed over the last years. By using the 10-
second rolling correlation between the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures, 
presented in Figure 3c, Figure 9 plots these data according to the time of day (GMT). 
As shown in Table 2, observations are rare after 10:00 p.m. and before 6:00 a.m. 
(GMT), thus we regroup them in the “22-05” category on the chart. Figure 9 shows 
that the “October 2008-December 2009” co-movements are higher between 1 p.m. 
and 8 p.m. (GMT). This corresponds broadly to the United States working hours. 
Earlier, during the day, when the European markets open, the co-movements are still 
                                                 
17
 See UNCTAD (2011) chapter 4.4 for a discussion about intentional herding. 
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positive, but tend to be lower. The “January 2010 – December 2011” co-movements 
depict a different picture. As we observe, difference between the working hours in 
Europe and in the United States is blurred.  
 
Two explanations behind this change come to mind. The first regards the liquidity of 
the market. For HFT to work, one needs a large number of transactions. Since the 
selected instruments we observe are traded in the United States, the number of ticks 
is larger during the United States working hours (Table 2). As the number of 
transactions gradually increases, liquidity becomes also sufficient at 10 seconds 
during the European working hours. The other hypothesis relates to the fact that the 
leading HFT firms were first mainly based and active in the United States. Since HFT 
requires constant monitoring, in case the algorithms spiral out of control; it is 
possible that there were more US-based-monitored algorithms at the beginning and 
that Europe-based-monitored HFT started to catch up afterwards. 
 
Figure 9: Time-of-day distribution of the 10-second rolling correlations computed over 
150 seconds between the WTI and the E-mini S&P 500 futures (front month), 2008m10-
2011m12 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper documented striking similarities in the evolution of the rolling correlations 
between the returns on several commodity futures and the ones on the US stock 
market, computed at high frequencies. It also highlighted a structural change that 
took place recently in these markets. Prior to 2008, high-frequency co-movements 
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between commodity and equity markets did not usually differ from zero over a long-
lasting period at such high frequencies. In the course of 2008, these correlations 
departed from zero and became strongly positive after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. 
 
The persistence of this trend until December 2011—except for crude oil in early 
2011, which coincides with the uprising in Libya—remains difficult to explain. Further 
research is needed to get a complete understanding of the mechanisms at work 
behind this structural change. Yet, given the high frequencies, we think that HFT 
strategies, in particular the trend-following ones, are playing a key role. We believe a 
conjunction of factors made that change possible. First, financial technical innovation 
spurred HFT through the gradual introduction of full electronic trading on exchange 
platforms since 2005. Second, investors moved away from passive strategies and 
opted for active ones when the rising trends on equity and commodity markets 
stopped, in particular since the fall of 2008. Third, lasting uncertainties and positive 
feedback effects reinforced this trend. 
 
In our view, this finding adds to the growing empirical evidence supporting the idea 
that the financialization of commodity markets has an impact on the price 
determination process. Indeed, the recent price movements of commodities are 
hardly justified on the basis of changes of their own supply and demand. In fact, the 
strong correlations between different commodities and the S&P 500 at very high 
frequency are really unlikely to reflect economic fundamentals since these indicators 
do not vary at such speed. Moreover, given the large selection of commodities we 
analyse, we would expect to have different behaviours due to their seasonality, 
fundamentals and specific physical market dynamics. Yet, we do not observe these 
differences at any frequency. In addition, the fact that these correlations at high 
frequencies started during the financial shocks provides additional support for 
financial-based factors behind this structural change. Therefore, the very existence 
of cross-market correlations at high frequencies favours the presence of automated 
trading strategies operated by robots on multiple assets. Our analysis suggests that 
commodity markets are more and more prone to events in global financial markets 
and likely to deviate from their fundamentals. 
 
This result is important for at least two reasons. First, it questions the diversification 
strategy and portfolio allocation in commodities pursued by financial investors. 
Second, it shows that, as commodity markets become financialized, they are more 
prone to external destabilizing effects. In addition, their tendency to deviate from 
their fundamentals exposed them to sudden and sharp corrections. 
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